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THE MODAL ARGUMENT IS NOT CIRCULAR
Richard Swinburne

Hasker's claim that my modal argument for substance dualism is epistemically
circular is implausible. Someone can accept Premise 2 (which, Hasker claims,
is the premise which generates the circularity) without ever understanding the
conclusion, or without accepting Premise 3.

Hasker claims that my argument for substance dualism is epistemically
circular in the sense that "no reasonably well-informed person would
accept the premise who does not already accept the conclusion". The
premise he has in mind is my premise 2 which says, loosely in words,
that it is logically possible that I who am conscious in 1984 should go on
existing in 1985, even if my body is destroyed at the end of 1984 - whatever else might be the case in 1984 compatible with my conscious existence (and the subsequent destruction of my body). The conclusion of
my argument, however concerns an item not mentioned in this premise
- "a soul". The term by which this item is introduced needs careful definition (it has after all been used by philosophers and others in many different senses) - I defined it' as the "immaterial stuff which forms part of
me". The argument was designed to show that there is a part of me separate from my body, and has the consequence - given the logical possibility of disembodiment (argued for in the text) - that that is the essential
part of me. So it does not seem very plausible to suppose that the argument is epistemically circular in the stated sense - since someone might
accept the premises without ever understanding the conclusion. The
grounds for accepting the premises are the coherence of various thought
experiments described in two pages of my texf; including ones easily
graspable by seven-year old religious believers or readers of fairy stories. These thought experiments involve my surviving despite various
things happening to my body. They do not mention things happening
in the wider world; but the latter is evidently fairly irrelevant. My survival is not rendered logically impossible by events further away, such
as explosions on Jupiter. All philosophical arguments depend on the
coherence or incoherence of various claims, and the justification for
these claims depends ultimately on the coherence or incoherence of particular thought experiments. Almost any philosophical principle can be
challenged by apparent counter-instances (of a paradoxical kind not initially considered), which can be ruled out by making the principle more
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precise. Apparent counter-instances to Premise 2 require it to be toughened up by introducing the notion of a "hard fact" defined in my way
(no more difficult to understand than the normal notion). But (even
thus tightened up) the premise can be accepted without any understanding of the item mentioned in the conclusion.
Another reason why Premise 2 may be accepted by someone who
denies the conclusion is that they may deny Premise 3 - there are lots of
philosophers in that category Call those who believe in teletransportation, for example). Separate arguments are required - which I give - in
favour of that premise. True, if anyone accepts both Premises 2 and 3
(and Premise 1) and thinks through what that involves, they will accept
the conclusion. But of course that goes for any valid argument. And
they'd need to think it through - I've certainly met professional philosophers who have initially granted me all my premises, but withdrawn
their initial assent as I went through the argument.
Premise 3 was not, incidentally, meant to be understood in such a
way that it ruled out re-creation; only re-creation of me without any part
of me being re-created. That was, I agree, unclear in the original version
of the argument. In the revised edition of The Evolution of the Soul, I
defined q more carefully as follows: "To say, as q does, that my body is
destroyed in the last instant of 1984, is just to say that my body existed
during a period terminating with the last instant of 1984, but not during
any period beginning with that instant.'"

University of Oxford
NOTES
1.

The Evolution of the Soul, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1997), p. 323. My page references are to the revised edition of this book. I

mention explicitly below the only place where the text differs from that of
the original edition.
2. lbid., pp. 151-2.
3. Ibid., p. 323.

